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Suability of School Boards and
School Board Members
Anne S. McFarland*
suits under 42 United States Code §1983
against school boards and school board members have burgeoned.
Suits have been brought by teachers involved in union activity,' by
teachers who allege nonrenewal of contracts due to racial discrimination,2 by pupils who challenge hair and dress regulations, by unwed
mothers who seek readmission to school, 4 and by militant students
who claim the right to practice-teach. 5
N THE PAST THREE YEARS,

That such suits are of concern to board members is evident from
a recent quote from the American School Board Journal:

Teachers are suing school boards these days at the drop
of a civil right. And that is no mere figure of speech. This is
the kind of lawsuit that can be brought against school board
members as individuals and can force payment of damages out
of a boardsman's own pocket.6
These suits are definitely different from the contract or tort actions
that have been familiar to boards. Actually, the courts have not agreed
as to whether §1983 suits against individual board members are
proper or even as to whether suits against boards are allowed. The
root of the problem is the word "person" in §1983. Whereas in the
majority of such suits the interpretation of the word "person" is not
in issue, in a sizeable minority of the suits it becomes central.
It appears, however, that a solution for the difficulties is already
apparent if one of the common rationales for permitting suit, the
*A.B., Oberlin College; M.L.S., Case Western Reserve University; Second-year student
at Cleveland State University College of Law.
1 McLaughlin v. Tilendis, 398 F.2d 287 (7th Cir. 1968) ; Hanover Township Fed'n. of
Teachers v. Hanover Community School Corp., 318 F.Supp. 757 (N.D. lad. 1970);
Roberts v. Lake Central School Corp., 317 F.Supp. 63 (N.D. Ind. 1970) ; Local 858
of the Am. Fed'n. of Teachers v. School Dist. No. I in the County of Denver and
State of Colo., 314 F.Supp. 1069 (D. Colo. 1970).
2 Harkless v. Sweeny Independent School Dist., 427 F.2d 319 (5th Cir. 1970); cert.
denied, 400 U.S. 991 (1970) Freeman v. Gould Special School Dist. of Lincoln County.
Ark., 405 F.2d 1153 (8th Cir. 1969); Rolfe v. County Bd. of Educ. of Lincoln County,
Tenn., 391 F.2d 77 (6th Cir. 1968) ; Glover v. Daniel, 318 F.Supp. 1070 (N.D. Ga.
1969); McDonald v. Marlin Independent School Dist., 313 F.Supp. 1162, (W.D. Tex.
1969); Porcelli v. Titus, 302 F.Supp. 726 (D.N.J. 1969) cert. denied, 402 U.S. 944
(1971) ; McBeth v. Bd. of Educ. of the DeVall's Bluff School Dist. No. 1, 300 F.
Supp. 1270 (E.D. Ark. 1969) .
3 Ferrell v. Dallas Independent School Dist., 392 F.2d 697 (5th Cir. 1968) ; Martin v.
Davison, 322 F.Supp. 318 (W.D. Pa. 1971); Bannister v. Paradis, 316 F.Supp. 185
(D.N.H. 1970); Cordova v. Chonko, 315 F.Supp. 953 (N.D. Ohio 1970); Schwartz
v. Galveston Independent School Dist., 309 F. Supp. 1034 (S.D. Tex. 1970); Westley
v. Rossi, 305 F.Supp. 706 (D. Minn. 1969).
4 Perry v. Grenada Municipal Separate School Dist., 300 F.Supp. 748 (N.D. Miss. 1969).
5 James v. West Virginia Bd. of Regents, 322 F.Supp. 217 (S.D. W. Va. 1971).
6 Nolte, Those Ugly Lawuilts and WChy More Teachers Are Using Them, 158 AM.
SCHOOL BD. J. 34 (1970).
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doctrine of Ex parte Young, is combined with a consideration of the
meaning that was intended for §1983 by the Congress that drafted it.
A clear solution is desperately needed not only for school board members who find themselves being sued but also for those teachers,
pupils, and parents who feel that their civil rights are being abridged
by school boards; the "drop of a civil right" may be a serious matter.
The same problems face boards of trustees, regents, etc., of universities and colleges and an occasional state board of education.
Title 42 U.S.C. §1983 reads as follows:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,
regulation, custom or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United
States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the
deprivation of any rights, privileges or immunities secured
by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party
injured in an action at7 law, suit in equity, or other proper
proceeding for redress.
This statute was enacted in 1871 during the Reconstruction Era and
has been referred to as the Ku Klux Act because at that time a great
deal of Congress' attention was focused on the lawless conditions in
the South, largely due to the activities of the Klan. 8 However, the
remedy provided by §1983 was not against the Klan but against
those officials who represented the state but were unwilling or unable
to enforce the law. 9 A modern writer, Chester J. Antieau, asserts that
the act's purpose was:
.. .to provide a civil action to protect persons against
misuse of power possessed by virtue of state law and made
possible because the defendant was clothed with the authority
of the state.'0
Indeed, the title of the legislation was "An Act to enforce the Provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the
United States and for other purposes.""'
A leading case upon which much of the modern interpretation
of §1983 is based is Monroe v. Pape.'2 This was a suit brought by a
citizen against police officers and against the City of Chicago for
damages for unlawful invasion of plaintiff's home and illegal search,
seizure, and detention. Suit was dismissed against the City of Chicago
but allowed as to the individual police officers. In its opinion, the
Supreme Court traced the legislative history of §1983, and its interpretation of the word "person" was governed by its finding that the
response in Congress during the debates on the bill was totally hostile
to making municipalities liable for injuries done to individuals. 13
I Civil Action for Deprivation of Rights 42 U.S.C. §1983
S Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 174 (1961).
9 Id. at 176.
10 C. ANTIEAU,

(1970).

FEDERAL CIVIL RIGHTS ACTS; CIVIL PRACTICE 49 (1971).

11 Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 171 (1961).
12 Id.
is Id. at 191.
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Thus, the Court determined that a municipality was not a "person"
within the meaning of §1983.
This interpretation by the Supreme Court has been questioned
in a law review note which argues that the legislature was opposed
to making a municipality liable for the acts of the general populace
rather than the acts of its governmental officials. 14 The note discusses
the "Dictionary Act" passed two months prior to §1983. This act defined a number of terms in use in the legislation of that period, and
the word "person" was clearly to extend to both political and corporate bodies. 15 Thus, the conclusion is that in passing §1983, Congress
clearly intended municipalities to be liable for injuries inflicted by
the action or inaction of municipal officials. Nevertheless, the holding
in Monroe has been extremely influential in interpreting §1983. Footnote 50 of the opinion states:
. . . Since we hold that a municipal corporation is not
a "person" within the meaning of §1983, no inference to the
contrary can any longer be drawn from these cases.16
This holding is commonly mentioned in the §1983 cases involving
school boards or school board members brought in the federal courts.
That the Supreme Court has, since Monroe, entertained suits against
school boards without raising the "person" issue, has apparently not
been influential with the lower courts, although it is evident from
case records that a good number of them have not raised the question.
It is not clear whether the Supreme Court, in not facing the issue,
is ignoring it or whether it has decided that there is no issue regarding
school boards and "person".
An examination of the cases in which the "person" issue has
been raised shows no consistency in the approach to and treatment of
the issue. It is submitted that this situation mirrors the state of the
law as it now exists. The crux of the problem is the tension between
the eleventh amendment and the fourteenth amendment to the Constitution. The eleventh amendment reads:
The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or in equity, commenced
or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of
another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.
The relevant portion of the fourteenth amendment reads:
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United
States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
14 Note, Developing Governmental Liability Under 42 U.S.C. §1983, 55 MiNN. L. Rav.
1201, 1206 (1970).

Id. The full title of the act is "An Act Prescribing the Form of the enacting and
resolving Clauses of Acts and Resolutions of Congress, and Rules for the Construction
thereof."
18 Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 191 (1961).
15
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A conflict arises in that the eleventh amendment limits suits
against the states, while the fourteenth amendment prohibits certain
actions on the part of the states. If the state cannot be sued, there is
no remedy for state actions prohibited in the fourteenth amendment.
On its face §1983 is directed against those who act "under color of any
statute, ordinance, regulation, cusom or usage, of any State or Territory." One acting under such "color of law" would almost certainly
be a public official.
As noted earlier, at note 11, the very title of the legislation that
produced §1983 indicates that its purpose was to enforce the provisions of the fourteenth amendment. If §1983 conflicts with the
eleventh amendment in its provision of an avenue for suit against
the state, is §1983 unconstitutional? Authority for the passage of §1983
can be seen in the "necessary and proper" clause of the Constitution
which reads as follows:
To make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for
carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other
Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of
17 the
United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof.
As a means of resolving the conflicts evident here, one student of
constitutional law has suggested that, by adoption of the fourteenth
amendment, any portion of the eleventh amendment which conflicts
has been repealed. 18
The leading interpretation of the eleventh amendment is the
Supreme Court's decision in Ex parte Young' 9 in which it was held
that a state official who exceeded his authority was no longer acting
with the authority of the state and was therefore not protected from
suit against him as an individual. Some courts have applied the same
rationale to governmental boards which exceed their authority. These
boards are treated as corporate "persons" and are suable as such.
This point is illustrated by a school board case, Louisiana State Board
of Education v. Baker, in which the court stated:

The vital principle, however, is not the difference between an individual and a board, it is the difference between
the State (the principal granted immunity) and its agents
(public officials or public boards) when the 20act in question
exceeds the agent's constitutional authority.
The conclusion here is that the "agent" of the state may be either an
individual or a "board", and in either case, where the authority of
the agent has been exceeded, the agent will be personally liable for
his acts.
It will be seen that all of the views mentioned-the doctrine of
Monroe, the doctrine of Ex parte Young, references to the eleventh and
1

U.S. Const. art. I, §8.

Is Interview with David

E. Engdahl, Associate Prof. of Law, Univ. of Colorado, Feb.

i .16, 1972.
i9

Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908).

20 Louisiana State Bd. of Educ. v. Baker, 339 F.2d 911, 912 (5th Cir. 1964).
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fourteenth amendments-as well as certain other views, are included
in the opinions written in §1983 suits against school boards and school
board members. These case records are often difficult to understand
purely from the standpoint of the pleadings alone. Often suit is
brought against both the board in its representative capacity and also
against the members as individuals. In other cases, either the board is
sued in its representative capacity or only the individual members
are sued. Sometimes it is very difficult to ascertain from the case
report exactly who all of the defendants are. 1 In Miller v. Parsons
the case report contains the statement that the "court construes the
loosely drawn complaint as an effort to sue Parsons both individually
23
and in his official capacity. '22 The case report in Pavlak v. Duffy
contains the puzzling reference to the fact that while the board of
trustees are individually named, they are specifically sued only in
their official capacities. In Bradley v. School Board of the City of Rich-

mond, Virginia 4 it is also very difficult to tell who the individual defendants are.
As indicated earlier, there are two questions facing the courts
that entertain the "person" argument: whether suit can be brought
against a school board and whether suit can be brought against the
individual board members. Each question has been answered both
positively and negatively. In the discussion which follows, each
response to these questions will be treated separately.
Suits Dismissed Against the Board in its Representative Capacity
The holding in Monroe that a municipal corporation is not a "person" is by far the predominant single reason for dismissing suits
against school boards in their representative capacities. In three of
these cases, it was specifically held that the suits would be dismissed
only insofar as damages were sought but would be allowed as far
as the relief sought was injunctive in nature. 25 These three Wisconsin
courts read Monroe as narrowly as possible, and since Monroe was a
suit for damages, these courts held that it would not control a suit
for injunctive relief. In six other cases the decision in Monroe is
directly or indirectly controlling as precluding suit against a school
board in its representative capacity. 26 In two of these cases, the suit
was for damages only, but in the other four both damages and in21 -Derby v. The Univ. of Wis., 325 F.Supp. 163 (E.D. Wis. 1971).
22 Miller v. Parsons, 313 F.Supp. 1150, 1151 (M.D. Pa. 1970).
2 Pavlak v. Duffy, 48 F.R.D. 396 (D. Conn. 1969).
24 Bradley v. School Bd. of the City of Richmond, Va., 324 F.Supp. 401 (E.D. Va. 1971).
25 Henson v. City of St. Francis, 322 F.Supp. 1034 (E.D. Wis. 1970) ; Abel v. Gousha,
313 F.Supp. 1030 (E.D. Wis. 1970); Gouge v. Joint School Dist. No. 1, 310 F.Supp.

984 (W.D. Wis. 1970).
25 Harvey v. Sadler, 331 F.2d 387 (9th Cir. 1964) ; Martin v. Davison, 322 F.Supp.
318 (W.D. Pa. 1971); Blount v. LaDue School Dist., 321 F.Supp. 1245 (E.D. Mo.
1970) ; Pavlak v. Duffy, 48 F.R.D. 396 (D. Conn. 1969) ; Morey v. Independent School

Dist. No. 492, 312 F.Supp. 1257 (D. Minn. 1969); Patton v. Bennett, 304- F.Supp. 297
(E.D. Tenn. 1969).
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junctive relief were sought. Unlike the Wisconsin courts, these courts
made no distinction between Monroe's application to actions for damages and its application to actions for injunctive relief.
In the remaining cases Monroe is not mentioned. In the case of
27
Sellers v. Regents of the University of California, plaintiffs asked for

an injunction, declaratory judgment and damages when they were
denied the use of university buildings for a "Vietnam Commencement". Although the case was subsequent to Monroe, three other
ninth circuit cases are cited as authority for the statement that:
We draw attention to the fact that the action is being prosecuted against The Regents of the University of California, a

corporation.The appellee is a corporation created by the Constitution of the State of California. As such it is not a proper
party since it is not a "person" within the meaning of 42
U.S.C. §1983.28

None of the cases relied upon mentions Monroe. In Schwartz v. Galveston Independent School District29 the court held that defendant board

in its representative capacity could be dismissed without affecting
the issues. The court stated:
In a suit against individual schuol officials in their individual capacity only, an injunction may issue binding all
defendants and those acting in concert with them .

.

. Such

an injunction provides relief as effective 3as
0 an injunction
operating against a school district directly.
This is one of the few cases in which the question of proper parties
was raised by the court sua sponte. In the remaining two cases there
is no clear rationale for dismissal; it should be noted that one of
these cases was prior to Monroe.21
There exists, then, a situation in which Monroe is pre-eminent
but is interpreted differently, sometimes to bar all suits against boards
and sometimes to bar only suits for damages. It is interesting to note
that the cases that do not rely on Monroe vary from having no clear
rationale for dismissal to relying on cases other than Monroe to get
the same result that reliance upon Monroe would give.
Suits Allowed Against the Board in its Representative Capacity
It has been seen that many courts have been willing to read
Monroe as controlling only in cases where damages are sought. There
Sellers v. Regents of the Univ. of Calif., 432 F.2d 493 (9th Cir. 1970), cert. denied,
4-01 U.S. 991 (1971).
28 Id. at 500.
29 Schwartz v. Galveston Independent School Dist., 309 F.Supp. 1034 (S.D. Tex. 1970).
27

so Id. at 1038.
31 Miller v. Parsons, 313 F.Supp. 1150 (M.D. Pa. 1970) ; Miller v. Bd. of Educ. of Dist.
of Columbia, 106 F.Supp. 988 (D.D.C. 1952).
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in which suit is permitted against school boards
are, then, many cases
32
for equitable relief.

There are other cases that'rely on the Ex parte Young doctrine
rather than Monroe although these cases are post-Monroe. Two Louisi33
ana cases bear this out. In Louisiana State Board of Education v. Baker,
an action was brought by Negro students seeking admission to a state
college. The attorney general's defense for the Board was that the
eleventh amendment shields the state and its agencies from suit
without their consent. The court remarked that the attorney general
misunderstood the doctrine of Ex parte Young, and that any state
agency, individual or board would be liable to suit when exceeding its
authority. 33 a In the case of McCoy v. Louisiana State Board of Educa-

tion, 4 a year later, the same court merely handed down a per curiam
opinion, noting that for the seventh time in recent years, it was holding that a state agency is not immune from suit to enjoin it from
enforcing an unconstitutional statute. In Lee v. Board of Regents of
State Colleges,35 a seventh circuit court ruled similarly. Plaintiffs had
brought suit because a school newspaper refused to print their
editorial statement, and the court held that it has been settled law
since Er parte Young that suits to enjoin state and county officials
from invading constitutional rights are not forbidden by the eleventh
amendment. The court also made the same observation that the
Louisiana court made by indicating that the fact that the board
is a "body corporate" rather than a natural person did not excuse
the board under §1983. A pre-Monroe case also relied on Ex parte Young
in permitting suit.36

The only other pre-Monroe case is the 1947 case of Botnar v.

Keyes 37 where plaintiff teacher was dismissed following service on

a federal jury. At one particular stage of the suit, the principal was
the only defendant, but in this opinion, Learned Hand referred to the
fact that the board was a corporate body which may be sued but
that it had no part in the wrong alleged. The post-Monroe case of
Porcelli v. Titus 38 used the same rationale when it was stated that the
board of education is a corporate body which may sue and be sued.
32 Butts v. Dallas Independent School Dist., 436 F.2d 728

(5th Cir. 1971) ; Orr. v.
Thorpe, 427 F.2d 1129 (5th Cir. 1970) ; Harkless v. Sweeny Independent School Dist.,
427 F.2d 319 (5th Cir. 1970) ; Henson v. City of St. Francis, 322 F.Supp. 1034 (E.D.
Wis. 1970); Local 858 of the Am. Fed'n. of Teachers v. School Dist. No. 1 in the
County of Denver and State of Colo., 314- F.Supp. 1069 (D. Colo. 1970); Abel v.
Gousha, 313 F.Supp. 1030 (E.D. Wis. 1970) ; Gouge v. Joint School Dist. No. 1, 310
F. Supp. 984 (W.D. Wis. 1970); Roth v. Bd. of Regents of State Colleges, 310 F.
Supp. 972 (W.D. Wis. 1970).
33 Louisiana State Bd. of Educ. v. Baker, 339 F.2d 911 (5th Cir. 1964).
33, Id. at 912.
34 McCoy v. Louisiana State Bd. of Educ., 345 F.2d 720 (5th Cir. 1965).
35 Lee v. Bd. of Regents of State Colleges, 44-1 F.2d 1257 (7th Cir. 1971).
36 Orleans Parish School Bd. v. Bush, 242 F.2d 156 (5th Cir. 1957).
37 Bomar v. Keyes, 162 F.2d 136 (2d Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 825 (1947).
38 Porcelli v. Titus, 302 F.Supp. 726 (D. N.J. 1969), cert. denied, 4-02 U.S. 944 (1971).
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There may be the implication here that a board, in becoming a corporate entity, has waived the eleventh amendment and may be sued.
In the only remaining post- Monroe cases, the rationales are simply
not clear as to why the board was allowed.3 9
Again, the bases for allowing suits against the boards are varied.
Moizroe is used to argue that suits for injunctive relief may be allowed; at other times the doctrine of Ex parte Young is used, and at
still other times the theory that a coporate body may sue and be
sued is relied upon.
Suits Dismissed Against Individual Board Members
_In only four cases were suits against individual board members
dismissed, and in two of these cases, suits against the board in its
representative capacity were also brought and were allowed. In
Abel v. Gousha,40 the court stated that the gravamen of the complaint
was ,improper actions by the board in its corporate capacity, and that
since there was no complaint about individual action by any board
member, the individual members were entitled to dismissal. This
case involved suit by a teacher who complained that she was discharged after she was a party to certain demonstrations. She sought
reinstatement to employment and damages. In Henson v. City of St.
Francis,41 the same court ruled that the action must fail because there
was no individual activity. Here plaintiff teachers were seeking damages, reinstatement and a declaratory judgment. Their contention was
that the board had denied them their fourteenth amendment rights
in discharging them without a public hearing. Obviously, in both
cases, the court felt that there were valid causes of action against
the .boards as entities and desired to permit redress for the alleged
actions of those entities. The conclusion to be reached is that the
court was loathe to assess damages against individuals and so dismissed the suit as to them. This is in direct contradiction to the holding in Monroe that damages could be collected from the individual
defendants but not from the municipality. An argument can be made
that these cases are distinguished from Monroe in that the individual
defendants in Monroe were separable from the City of Chicago while
the individual defendants in Abel and Henson were, in turn, the members of the corporate board being sued.
In'a third Wisconsin case, Lessard v. Van Dale,42 suit was brought
only. against the individual board members. Plaintiff teacher asked
for money damages when she was discharged without cause and
was not given the public hearing provided by state statute. The
Lessard court mentioned the Abel case and stated that the issue in
89 Scher v. Bd. of Educ. of the Town of W. Orange, 424- F.2d 741 (3d Cir. 1970);

Swarm v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 300 F.Supp. 1381 (W.D. N.C. 1969).

40 Abel v. Gousha, 313 F.Supp. 1030 (E.D. Wis. 1970).
41
42

Henson v. City of St. Francis, 322 F.Supp. 1034 (E.D. Wis. 1970).
Lessard v. Van Dale, 318 F.Supp. 74 (E.D. Wis. 1970).
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both Lessard and Abel was not whether a cause of action could be
stated against the individual board members but whether it was
stated. The court ruled that the plaintiff was alleging misconduct by
the defendant as a board and that there was no action against them as
individuals.
The remaining case in which suit was dismissed as to the individual defendants is Morey v. Independent School District No. 49248 in
which suit was also brought against the district. Plaintiff was a teacher claiming increases in back pay and both actual and exemplary
damages. The suit was dismissed against the district under Monroe
because the claim was not for equitable relief and was dismissed
against the individuals for failure to allege deprivation of any rights,
privileges or immunities secured by the Constitution. Again, a court
found no cause of action against individual defendants when damages
were being sought. However, lest this result of not allowing damages
against individuals be thought to occur without deviation, it should
be noted that there are three other school board cases in which suits
for damages were allowed against individuals. 44 In none of these
cases does the record indicate conclusively what was the final disposition of the damage question.
Suits Permitted Against Individual Board Members
An appropriate division to use here is that between cases in which
the "person" issue was treated as dicta and cases in which it was
germane to the case at hand. In two of the latter, the doctrine of
Ex parte Young was applied to allow suit against the individual members. In Board of Trustees of Arkansas A & M College v. Davis, a faculty
member brought suit for damages and equitable relief when his
position was terminated, and the court stated "Without the cloak
of valid state authority to immunize defendant's actions plaintiff is
allowed a remedy against them individually." 45 In Whitner v. Davis,
the court made the similar statement that "Individuals, sued in their
capacity as trustees of a state agency, are not protected by the
Eleventh Amendment any more than the agency itself is protected by
' 46
that Amendment.
In three other cases there is the common thread that good faith
action will protect defendants in suits that are allowed against them
as individuals. In McLaughlin v. Tilendis,4 7 the plaintiffs were probationary teachers suing for damages and contending that their dismissal arose because of their association with the American Federa43 Morey v. Independent School Dist. No. 492, 312 F.Supp. 1257 (D. Minn. 1969).
44 Whitner v. Davis, 410 F.2d 24- (9th Cir. 1969) ; McLaughlin v. Tilendis, 398 F.2d
287 (7th Cir. 1968); Board of Trustees of Ark. A. & M. College v. Davis, 396 F.2d
730 (8th Cir. 1968) cert. denied, 393 U.S. 962 (1968).
45d. of Trustees of Ark. A. & M. College v. Davis, 396 F.2d 730, 733 (8th Cir. 1968)
cert. denied, 393 U.S. 962 (1968).
46 Whitner v. Davis, 410 F.2d 24, 30 (9th Cir. 1969).
41 McLaughlin v. Tilendis, 398 F.2d 287 (7th Cir. 1968).
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tion of Teachers local union. The court ruled that defendants would
have a qualified immunity dependent upon good faith action. A Wisconsin case, Gouge v. Joint School District No. 1,48 relied on McLaughlin
in holding that defendants have a qualified immunity. Gouge is simply
not clear on its face as to why suit was allowed against the individual
members. The same problem arises in Patton v. Bennett,49 where suit
was permitted against individuals with no clear rationale, though
again the qualified privilege based on good faith action was recognized.
The four remaining cases have no common rationale for permitting suit. In Miller v. Board of Education of District of Columbia,5"

the court simply says that while the board is not an entity and is
not subject to suit, the respective members are properly sued. In
Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, the court stated:

The motion of the individual defendants, members of the
school board, to dismiss was and is denied. This is a suit
under the Civil Rights Act involving questions of equal protection of laws and racial discrimination and segregation in
the public schools. The individual defendants are proper
parties and their presence is appropriate and desirable.5 1
The reasons for this statement are not explained. In a case involving
suit for injunction by long-haired students, Schwartz v. Galveston Independent School District,5 2 the court felt that the complaint failed to
state a claim on which relief could be granted against any but the
individual defendants. In this case, quoted at note 30, supra, the court
held that suit against the defendants as a school board could be dismissed because injunctive relief against the individual members
would be as effective as injunctive relief against the board. Bradley
v. School Board of the City of Richmond, Virginia

again simply indi-

cated that suit can be brought against the individuals; there is no
reference to Ex parte Young or to the Monroe decision. There is some
confusion as to whether the case report, in referring to individuals,
is talking about school board members or other officials, such as
the superintendent or principal.
There are also five cases in which the question of suability of
individual board members was treated as dicta. Two have no clear
rationale for allowing suit, 54 two seem to rely on Ex parte Young, 5 5 and
48 Gouge v. Joint School Dist. No. 1, 310 F.Supp. 984 (W.D. Wis. 1970).

49 Patton v. Bennett, 304 F.Supp. 297 (E.D. Tenn. 1969).
50 Miller v. Bd. of Educ. of Dist of Columbia, 106 F.Supp. 988 (D. D.C. 1952).
51 Swam v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 300 F.Supp. 1381, 1382 (W.D. N.C.
1969).
52 Schwartz v. Galveston Independent School Dist., 309 F.Supp. 1034 (S.D. Tex. 1970).
53 Bradley v. School Bd. of the City of Richmond, Va., 324 F.Supp. 401 (E.D. Va. 1971).
54 Martin v. Davison, 322 F.Supp. 318 (W.D. Pa. 1971; Blount v. Ladue School Dist.,

321 F.Supp. 1245 (E.D. Mo. 1970).
5 Miller v. Parsons, 313 F.Supp. 1150 (M.D. Pa. 1970); Pavlak v. Duffy, 48 F.R.D.
396 (D. Conn. 1969).
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in the case of Harkless v. Sweeney Independent School District56 plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed the suit against individuals when two
jurymen expressed reluctance to grant damages against individual
board members. However, the court indicated that §1983 clearly intended that persons would be suable since many Supreme Court cases
since Monroe had ignored the issues of "person" in suits against state
57
officials. The Harkless decision is the subject of a law review note.
Again, then, there is confusion as to why suits against individuals
are allowed. Ex parte Young has been used to uphold these suits, but
in the majority of cases there is simply no clear rationale.
Conclusions
The discussion above has encompassed thirty-one cases in which
courts have clearly faced the problem of whether boards of education or their individual members may be proper parties defendant
in §1983 lawsuits. There is no easy way to summarize all of these
cases because of the great disparities in holdings, but a brief overview of certain aspects of these cases may be helpful. In eight cases,
suit against board members as individuals was allowed. In an additional five cases, dicta indicated that individuals would have been
proper parties defendant. In four cases, suit against individuals was
definitely not perimtted, and in all four cases, damages were sought.
Even though three other cases did permit suits for damages against
individuals, it seems fair to say that causes of action or individual
activity may be more difficult to find when it appears that damages
may be assessed against individual members than when it appears
that damages are being sought from the board as a representative
body.
In twenty-five cases where the board was sued in its representative capacity, fifteen suits were allowed and ten were prohibited.
In seven of these prohibited cases, however, suits had also been
brought and were allowed against individuals. Out of the total of
thirty-one cases, seven were absolutely dismissed; in four of these,
only the board was sued and dicta indicates that suits against individuals would have been permitted. It appears, then, that there is
generally a right of action against school boards and school board
members. The problem is to develop consistent rationales and doctrines upon which such suits can proceed.
It was stated earlier that, in a majority of the cases, the courts
have not raised the "person" issue. For the purposes of comparison,
a number of cases equal to the number discussed above have been
examined to ascertain whether there is any factor common to those
cases where the issue is not raised which is absent in those cases
where the issue is raised. The cases chosen for examination are almost
equally divided into cases in which the board was sued in its repre. O Harkless v. Sweeny Independent School
57 35 Albany L. Rev. 332 (1971).
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sentative capacity.58 and those in which individual members were
sued.5 9 There seems to be no factor common to those cases where the
issue is not raised which is absent in those cases where the issue is
raised. Thus, there is the dilemma that in the majority of the cases
the issue is not even raised, and when it is, there is no consistency
in its resolution.
How must this appear to those individuals who are serving on the
school boards of this nation? It has been written that:
There must be effective protection of individuals who
serve unselfishly in the capacity of school board members,
but who through no apparent fault of their own have run
that they have invaded
afoul of the law on an allegation
60
someone's constitutional rights.
No one would argue that many school board members do not often
serve unselfishly and without pay. On the other hand, running afoul
of someone's constitutional rights is no trivial problem. Board members are in positions of great sensitivity and power; the policy decisions of a school board often involve civil rights and affect a great
number of people in a given community.
It is partially the realization of both sides of this problem that
has brought the courts to their present posture of allowing suits
s Freeman v. Gould Special School Dist. of Lincoln County Ark., 405 F.2d 1153 (8th
Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 843 (1969); Rolfe v. County Bd. of Educ. of Lincoln County, Tenn., 391 F.2d 77 (6th Cir. 1968) ; Glover v. Daniel, 318 F.Supp. 1070
(N.D. Ga. 1969), aff'd., 434 F.2d 617 (5th Cir. 1970) ; McBeth v. Bd. of Educ. of the
DeVall's Bluff School Dist. No. 1, 300 F.Supp. 1270 (E.D. Ark. 1969) (teachers allege
racial discrimination in discharge) ; Johnson v. Branch, 364 F.2d 177 (4th Cir. 1966),
cert denied, 385 U.S. 1003 (1967); Hetrick v. Martin, 322 F.Supp. 545 (E.D. Ken.
1971); Orr. v. Trinter, 318 F.Supp. 1041 (S.D. Ohio 1970), reqd., 444 F.2d 128 (1971) ;
Robbins v. Bd. of Ed. of Argo Community High School Dist. 217, Cook County, Ill.,
313 F.Supp. 642 (N.D. Ill. 1970); Canty v. Bd. of Educ., City of New York, 312
F.Supp 254 (S.D. N.Y. 1970) (teachers allege wrongful non-renewal of contract);
James v. W. Va. Bd. of Regents, 322 F. Supp. 217 (S.D. W. Va. 1971) (student
teacher alleges right to practice teach); West v. Bd. of Educ. of Prince George's
County, 165 F.Supp. 382 (D. Md. 1958) (teacher claims back pay); Tinker v. Des
Moines Independent Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969) (students wearing
black armbands) ; Ferrell v. Dallas Independent School Dist., 392 F.2d 697 (5th Cit.
1968), ceri denied, 393 U.S. 856 (1968) (stundents with long hair); Sullivan v.
Houston Independent School Dist., 307 F.Supp. 1328 (S.D. Tex. 1969) (students publishing underground newspaper)*; Perry v. Grenada Municipal Separate School Dist.,
300 F.Supp. 748 (N.D. Miss. 1969) (unwed mothers wish to return to school).
59 Smith v. Bd. of Educ. of Morrillton School Dist. No. 32, 365 F.2d 770 (8th Cir. 1966).;
McDonald v. Marlin Independent School Dist., 313 F.Supp. 1162 (W.D. Tex. 1969)
teachers allege racial discrimination in discharge); Jones v. Hopper, 410 F.2d 1323
(10th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 991 (1970) ; Bradford v. School Dist. No. 20,
Charlestown, S.C., 364 F.2d 185 (4th Cir. 1966); Hanover Township Fed'n. of
Teachers v. Hanover Community School Corp., 318 F.Supp. 757 (N.D. Ind. 1970);
Roberts v. Lake Central School Corp., 317 F.Supp. 63 (N.D. Ind. 1970) ; Montgomery
v. White, 320 F.Supp. 303 (E.D. Tex. 1969); Shirck v. Thomas, 315 F.Supp. 1124(S.D. I1. 1970); Lucia v. Duggan, 303 F.Supp. 112 (D. Mass. 1969); Rackley v.
School Dist. No. 5, Orangeburg County, S.C., 258 F.Supp. 676 (D.S.C. 1966) (teachers
allege wrongful nonrenewal of contract); Connell v. Higginbotham, 403 U.S. 207
(1971) (teacher objected to loyalty oath); Bannister v. Paradis, 316 F.Supp. :185
(D.N.H. 1970) (student complains about dress code); Cordova v. Chonko, 315 F..
Supp. 953 (N.D. Ohio 1970) ; Westley v. Rossi, 305 F.Supp. 706 (D. Minn. 1969)
(students with long hair).
0oNolte, Suddenly Boardmen Can Be Sued as )ndividaals, 158 AM. SCHOOL BD. J., Oct.,
30, 32 (1970).
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against school boards and members more often than not, but being
very conservative when it comes to permitting suits for damages
against individual members. However, the plethora of rationales that
have been advanced for permitting or denying suits desperately needs
to be put into some kind of order so that the law will be predictable,
not only with regard for the position of the school board member,
but also for the teacher, pupil or parent who seeks to enforce rights
abridged by school boards.
It seems as though the beginning of a solution is apparent if certain rationales already in use are combined. First there is the holding
of Ex parte Young that those officials who overstep their authority
are stripped of immunity from suit. Next, there is the holding already
advanced by at least two courts that a school board can also be
stripped of its immunity as a board. Finally, §1983 may be considered
in the light of its contemporaneous "Dictionary Act," supra at note
15, in which "person" was distinctly understood to include a corporate person. Thus, suits could proceed against boards in their representative capacities with no question. It seems clear that not only is
the Supreme Court's interpretation of the legislative history of the
term "person" in §1983 questionable, but also that the court's own
position of not raising the issue with regard to school boards is a
matter of record. Thus, the courts that are currently citing Monroe
as authority to dismiss actions against school boards are on doubly
dangerous grounds.
At present the most prudent tactic is to sue both the corporate
body and the individual members, but there is still the danger.,that
under the prevailing interpretation of "person" in §1983, suit may be
dismissed against the board, and if damages are sought, it is very
likely that the suit will be dismissed against the individuals for "no
individual activity". In such cases there is no remedy left. By its
very nature, the school board acts as a body, and in most cases there
is no real necessity to seek remedies against individual members if
such remedies can be sought against the board. (This is, of course,
the converse of Schwartz v. Galveston Independent School District, discussed at note 30 supra.) Permitting suits against boards is consistent with established legal principles and would end much of the
unpredictability currently surrounding such suits.
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